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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DOUGLAS J. ALLRED and
GEORGE S. DIUMENTI II,
Plaintiffs/Appellees,

:
:
Case No. 93 - 0467

vs.

:

LARRY H. BROWN and ARTHUR J.
RITTER,

:
Priority No. 16

Defendant/Appellant.
vs.
MERCURY AIRCOURIER SERVICE,
a Utah corporation,

:

Third Party Defendant.

:

Plaintiffs/Appellees, George S. Diumenti II and Douglas J.
Allred, by and through counsel of record, and pursuant to the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits the following Brief of
Appellees/Respondents:
JURISDICTION AND ASSIGNMENT
Jurisdiction

is properly

before

the Utah

Supreme

Court

pursuant to Title 78 Chapter 2 Section 2 Utah Code; the Supreme
Court has assigned this appeal to the Court of Appeals pursuant to
the provisions of Rule 4A of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
and Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(4) (1953 as amended).

ISSUES ON APPEAL and STANDARD OF REVIEW
The following issues are raised on appeal: (1) Whether there
was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding of
fact that Brown was a party to a express bailment contract that was
breached; (2) Whether as an express term of the bailment contract,
Brown agreed that he would not fly the airplane until insurance on
the aircraft was obtained.
The simple question on appeal is whether the trial court had
a sufficient basis for finding an express bailment contract between
Diumenti and Brown, and whether such bailment contract included an
express agreement to insure the aircraft before it was flown by
Brown. Defendant attempts to argue that the trial court's finding
that Brown was not a party to a leasing contract under Plaintiffs'
first cause of action precludes a finding of breach under an
express bailment contract. This position is contrary to the trial
record, and is wholly unsupported by the evidence.
As will be discussed below, Defendant's position that Brown
could not be a party to a bailment contract under plaintiffs' third
cause of action, is essentially an attack on the factual findings
of the trial court, both at the time of the original ruling and in
subsequent findings. Such findings "shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous" with "due regard given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Grayson
Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989).
are viewed

The facts

favorable to the verdict and where there is any
2

reasonable support in the evidence for the verdict, it will not be
disturbed on appeal. Barlow Upholstery & Furniture Co. v. Emmel,
533 P.2d 900, at 902 (Utah 1975).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OR STATUTES
None.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case:
Appellees concur with Appellant's statement that a resolution
of this case involves an understanding of the law of bailments.
However, the issues in this case can be very simply stated:

Was

there sufficient evidence to find a bailment existed, and, if so,
did such bailment include an express undertaking or agreement by
Brown not to fly the aircraft until insurance on the airplane was
secured.
Appellees' contention that a bailment contract with Brown was
not possible because the trial court had "already determined that
no contract ever existed between Brown and Diumenti" ignores the
specific

ruling

of

the

trial

court when

it

dismissed

only

plaintiffs' first cause of action against Brown based on a lease
theory, and specifically reserved a ruling on plaintiffs' third
cause of action in bailment to a later date.
Appellant argues that even if a bailment contract is proven,
Appellees may not recover against Brown because Appellee has failed
to prove Appellant was negligent, and "negligence is the basis for
3

liability in a cause of action for bailment".

However, this

contention ignores well-settled bailment law which holds that a
party to a bailment will be liable for his failure to abide by
express bailment terms, such as the agreement in this case by
defendant Brown not to fly the airplane before obtaining insurance.
Dresser Industries v. Foss Launch & Tug Co., 560 P.2d 393 (Alaska
1977).

Therefore, this Court must determine whether there was

sufficient evidence for the trial court's finding that Brown
specifically agreed to secure insurance covering his use of the
airplane before flying the airplane.

If so, the trial court's

judgment against Brown should be upheld.
B. Course of Proceedings:
The matter was tried before the Honorable James S. Sawaya in
April 1989. Plaintiff's first cause of action in the complaint was
dismissed

as

against

Larry

Brown

at

the

conclusion

of

the

plaintiff's case. Following closing argument the trial court took
the matter under advisement. The trial court entered a memorandum
decision the 14th day of June 1989. (Record at 109-112) Defendants
filed a Motion To Amend Judgment or For New Trial on the 20th day
of June 1989.

(Record

at 113-114).

Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, and a Judgment against Larry Brown, prepared by
plaintiff's counsel, were signed by the trial court and entered the
18th day of July, 1989.

(Record at 120-123).

Defendants' motion

to amend judgment or for new trial was denied by the trial court in
a minute entry dated August 28, 1989, copies of which were mailed
4

to counsel that same date. (Record at 139) A formal order denying
defendants' Rule 59 motion was signed July 1990.
In July, 1990, defendant Brown initiated his first appeal in
this case.

On May 12, 1992, this Court issued an unpublished

opinion in which it found that the trial court had erred in
entering findings seemingly based on plaintiffs' first cause of
action in contract, after dismissing such cause of action as
against defendant Brown. This Court remanded the case to the trial
court, for a specific ruling under plaintiffs' negligence and
bailment causes of action, the second and third causes of action in
plaintiffs' action against defendants.

(See Decision in Initial

Appeal, Exhibit "A" attached hereto).
In September 1993, following oral argument in June 1993, the
trial court entered a new judgment against defendant Brown, and
made a specific finding that there existed a bailment contract
between the parties, which provided as an express agreement, that
"defendants would obtain insurance to cover the airplane during the
time the airplane was in the defendants' possession.

(See New

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Exhibit "B" attached
hereto).
In September, 1993, defendant Brown again appealed the trial
court's ruling.

(See Exhibit "C", attached hereto).

C. Disposition at Trial Court:
Judgment was granted in favor of plaintiffs against both
defendants.
5

D. Statement of Relevant Facts:
1. Plaintiffs were the owners of a twin engine Cessna 414
(hereinafter referred to as the "airplane") that was involved in a
crash at the Tooele Valley Airport, on or about May 9, 1984,
resulting in no injuries but in substantial property damage.
(Findings of Fact, paragraph 1, Record at 122; uncontroverted at
trial).
2. Defendant Brown was piloting the airplane at the time of
the

crash

at

Tooele.

(Transcript

at

23, uncontroverted

and

testified to by both Brown and Ritter throughout their testimony).
3.

At the time relevant to this proceeding, Defendant Brown

had been an officer, manager of operations, chief pilot, and an
owner of Mercury Aircourier Service and two affiliated companies
"controlled by [defendant] Mr. Ritter and [Brown]". (Transcript at
3-5; and 31-32).
4. At the time of the crash, defendant Brown was not covered
by existing insurance on the airplane, had not provided insurance
for his use of the airplane and had taken no action to assure that
insurance for his use of the airplane was in effect. (Original
Findings of Fact, paragraphs 2 and 3, Record at 122).
5. Defendant Brown was present and participated at a meeting
wherein the lease or use of the airplane was initially discussed,
which meeting involved Ritter, Brown, and Diumenti, and which took
place in Ritter!s home. (Transcript at 34 to 37, also at 103;
Diumenti transcript at 9).
6

6. Defendant Brown participated in a discussion at that first
meeting

"specifically

about getting

a waiver

for me on his

insurance since I didn't meet the open pilot clause" on the
existing insurance policy. (Testimony of Brown, Transcript at 36
lines 5-7; also Diumenti transcript at 11-12).
7.

Mr. Diumenti testified that at the first meeting the

parties discussed in detail obtaining insurance on the airplane.
Mr. Diumenti took a copy of the existing insurance policy on the
airplane

and

reviewed

it with

defendants

Brown

and Ritter.

Diumenti testified that the parties discussed obtaining an open
pilot waiver to the insurance policy, and that defendants indicated
they knew Diumenti's insurance carrier.

Diumenti testified that

Brown and Ritter indicated that "Mr. Brown would immediately, if
the matter were consummated, get with Valline Agency to get the
necessary waivers so that he could be added to the policy".
(Diumenti supplemental transcript at 10-15).

Finally, Diumenti

testified that there was a specific understanding with defendants
Ritter and Brown that they would "have their pilot added to the
waiver column of our policy and should they be engaged in services
or transactions that weren't covered by our policy, they would
obtain insurance for those situations."
transcript, at 15-16).

(Diumenti Supplemental

In connection with such understanding,

Diumenti testified that it was his understanding that Brown would
take his log to the insurer and undertake necessary activities to
obtain insurance (Diumenti supplemental transcript, at 16).
7

8. Diumenti

further

testified

that

it

was

the

parties

understanding that "the individual for Mr. Ritter that would be
flying the aircraft would be added to our policy and that any use
beyond the use prescribed
in the policy . . . would be a use insured by them, if it were not
already insured in the policy".
9.

(Diumenti Transcript at 33).

Diumenti testified that Brown agreed in the initial

meeting that "he would be the only person to fly the aircraft after
being added to the policy", and acknowledged "what he had to do to
get his waiver on that policy . . . ".

(Diumenti supplemental

transcript at 50-51).
10.

In response to questioning by Brian Bernard, Diumenti

testified that Brown made representations "about moving forward and
getting insurance coverage", and that he would be the only person
to fly the aircraft.

Further, Mr. Diumenti testified that after

the check out flight on April 30, 1984, he gave Brown the key to
the airplane and "told [Brown] that I didn't expect that airplane
to go anywhere until there was insurance", and Brown said he would
contact the insurance agent the next day.

(Diumenti supplemental

transcript at 51-52).
11. Prior to the Tooele flight and crash, Brown flew the
airplane and did landings on a flight to Pocatello, Idaho, under
the supervision of the owners and a pilot they had retained for
that flight. (Brown testimony, Transcript at 15-17).

8

12. Brown inspected and viewed the plane on various other
occasions prior to the Tooele flight, "to make sure that I knew
where the controls were, their function, and how to operate them."
(Brown testimony, Transcript at 18-19).
13.

Prior to the Tooele

flight, Brown

inquired

of the

airplane's physical condition in conversations with a Bart Hocker,
who Brown described as "our mechanic" and who was doing some work
on the airplane. (Brown testimony, Transcript at 39-40).
14. In responding to questions regarding authorization from
the airplane's owners for the work his mechanic was doing, Brown
testified

"I had no reason to doubt that there was an oral

agreement which was enforceable." (Brown testimony, Transcript at
225 lines 21-22).
15. Brown testified that he had approximately 30 years of
flying experience ("I have been flying regularly since 1954." Brown
testimony, Transcript at 6) and that he understood the importance
of insurance (Brown testimony, Transcript at 222) and that in their
ordinary course of doing business they assured that their pilots
were specifically named on their insurance policies even if they
were covered by the open pilot clause in order to absolutely assure
insurance coverage (Brown testimony, Transcript at 224 lines 1525).
16.

Ritter and

Brown were acting

in their

individual

capacities and not as agents of a corporation (Original Findings of
Fact paragraph 2, Record 122, also Memorandum Decision paragraph 2,
9

Record 110). They expressly agreed to take steps to be added to
plaintiff's insurance coverage or to provide their own coverage,
which they failed to do (Findings of Fact paragraphs 3 and 4,
Record at 122; Memorandum Decision paragraphs 2 and 3, Record at
110).
17.

At the time of the accident, Brown had physical control

of the aircraft (Transcript at 162.)
18.

In the trial, Colleen Ritter, defendant Arthur Ritterfs

wife, testified that she was present during the meeting between
Diumenti and defendants Brown and Ritter in the end of April, 1984
in which the lease of plaintiffs was discussed, and that it was her
understanding that "Mr. Diumenti was emphatic that whoever was
going to fly the airplane be covered by Mr. Diumenti?s insurance"
(Transcript, 203).
19.

Defendant Ritter testified that Diumenti "was really

adamant that we have the aircraft insured under his policy . . . . "
(Transcript at 79).
209. Brown testified that he had never received clearance from
Diumenti to fly the airplane. He further testified that he simply
"inferred" that insurance was obtained for him to fly the airplane,
and that he understood the importance of having insurance on an
aircraft (Transcript, at 221-222).

Finally, Brown testified that

he did not ever inquire to see if he was covered to fly the
Diumenti airplane (Transcript, at 226), and simply didn't think

10

about insurance at the time of the accident (Transcript at 227228).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant

Brown's

appeal

is

essentially

based

on

two

arguments:
First, since the trial court had determined that Brown was not
a party to a contract under plaintiffs' first cause of action for
breach of contract, Brown could not be held liable under a bailment
theory - plaintiffs' third cause of action.

Secondly, defendant

argues that even if a bailment existed between plaintiffs and
defendant Brown, the judgment against Brown must be dismissed
because "a finding of negligence is necessary before a bailee can
be liable for damages under a bailment", and the trial court made
no such negligence finding. As discussed below, the first argument
completely ignores the trial transcript at the time the first cause
of action was dismissed, at which time plaintiffs' third cause of
action under a bailment theory was specifically discussed and
reserved by the trial court for a later ruling.

The trial court

later specifically found an express bailment agreement with Brown,
in which he specifically agreed to secure insurance before flying
the airplane.

Brown's second argument ignores well-settled case

law, which holds that the general duty of a party to a bailment
will be modified by the express terms of such bailment.

11

Defendant Brown is incorrectly attempting to use the trial
court's dismissal of plaintiffs' first cause of action against
Brown as the basis for contending that the trial court found that
"no contract ever existed between Brown and Diumenti", even a
contract for a bailment covered by plaintiffs' third cause of
action, which was expressly reserved by the trial court for a later
ruling.

This is an incorrect interpretation of the trial court's

intent.

Further, the trial transcript is replete with evidence

which supports the trial court's ruling that Brown was a party to
a bailment, and that he expressly agreed to secure insurance before
flying the airplane.
As plaintiffs pointed out in their brief in the initial appeal
in this case, plaintiffs prosecuted the case on two alternative,
but not mutually exclusive theories of contract: one was based on
an alleged comprehensive and detailed agreement for a long term use
of the airplane, which cause of action was set forth in plaintiffs'
complaint as the first cause of action and which cause was also
dismissed as against Brown at the conclusion of the plaintiffs'
case.

The other contract theory was grounded in bailment: i.e.,

that defendants had possession of an airplane the plaintiffs held
title to, and that such possession and use was authorized (that is,
the airplane was not

stolen nor was

it being

used

without

authorization) pursuant to a bailment agreement among the parties,
including Brown, that included an express undertaking by Brown that
he would take and use the airplane only after either obtaining
12

insurance coverage or assuring that he was covered pursuant to
plaintiffs' insurance policy.
The evidence was uncontroverted that (1) Brown took possession
of and was flying the airplane; (2) that Brown had not assured or
verified

that he was covered

by insurance while

flying the

aircraft; (3) that the airplane was uninsured and crashed while
Brown was operating it; and (4) that plaintiffs incurred damages in
the sum of $33,133.86 as a result.

The testimony conflicted,

however, on the issue of whose obligation it was to assure that
Brown was covered

by

insurance prior

to Brown's

flying the

airplane, plaintiffs pointing the finger, so to speak, at the
defendants, and the defendants vice versa. The trial court was in
the best position to judge the weight and credibility of the
witnesses' testimony, and the trial court found that Brown had
indeed agreed to assure insurance coverage prior to taking and
using the airplane, and that his failure to do so was a breach of
the agreement.
After this case was remanded, the trial court entered specific
findings that a bailment contract between Diumenti and Brown
existed, and that such bailment included a specific agreement to
secure insurance before flying the airplane. (See Exhibit "B").
As indicated, the general rule that a bailee is only responsible
for losses result from his negligence will be modified if the
bailee expressly agrees to undertake a more specific duty. C.J.M.
Construction, Inc. v. Chandler Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 708 P.2d
13

60 (Alaska 1985). This specific finding by the trial court removes
any doubt as to the basis for the trial court's earlier ruling
against defendant Brown, and should not be disturbed on appeal.
Consequently, it is unnecessary

for this Court to find that

defendants were negligent.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND BROWN LIABLE
UNDER A BAILMENT CONTRACT
In the trial court's most recent findings of fact, it found
that (1) In connection with the delivery of possession and control
of

the

airplane

to defendants, defendants

agreed

to

obtain

insurance on the aircraft; (2) the evidence supports a finding that
possession and control of the airplane was delivered to defendants
under a bailment arrangement, and that defendants were bailees
under such arrangement; and (3) the evidence further supports a
finding that, under the bailment, there was an express agreement
between the parties that defendants would obtain insurance to cover
the airplane during the time the airplane was in the defendants'
possession.

(See Exhibit "B").

The trial transcript contains

abundant support for plaintiffs' position, concurred in by the
trial court, that Brown was a party to an oral bailment with
Diumenti attendant Brown's use of the airplane which specifically
included an agreement to assure insurance coverage by either taking
the steps necessary to be covered by plaintiffs' policy or to
obtain their own coverage.

Very simply, defendant Brown breached
14

that agreement by failing to provide insurance, as a result of
which the plaintiffs were damaged in the sum of $33,133.86.
Defendant argues that it cannot be held liable under a
bailment theory because the trial "already determined that no
contract existed between Diumenti and Brown".

However, this

argument completely ignores the specific discussion at the time of
the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' first cause of action,
in which it was clearly acknowledged that plaintiffs' cause of
action in bailment would be preserved.

The court record reads, in

pertinent part, as follows:
Mr. Barnard: We would move for dismissal of various
portions of the claim --of Mr. Lindsley's causes of
action. First, as to the contractual cause of action, it
names both Ritter and Brown as defendants.
Mr.
Diumentifs testimony today was clear. It was clear he
was entering into an agreement with Ritter. He makes no
claim at all that there was a contractual agreement with
Brown. We would move to dismiss that first cause of
action and contract against Brown.
The Court: By Mr. Diumentifs own admission, unless
you claim an implied contract —
Mr. Lindsley: Well, that's part of the reason why
we included Mr. Brown in this was the -- I think Mr.
Diumenti's testimony was unequivocal that his agreement
specifically was with Ritter. However, I think there was
[an] collateral agreement with Mr. Brown that the plane
wouldn't be flown unless he had -- that he would not fly
the airplane unless he made -- found the appropriate
rider from the insurance company.
The Court: That doesn't square with your pleadings.
You would have to -- you would want to amend your pleadings to conform with the evidence. You are claiming
there was an agreement entered May 8 with both these
parties that they would provide insurance coverage for
any losses occasioned to that aircraft Cessna 414.
15

Mr. Lindsley:
bailment.
The Court:
He's addressing
contract.

The third cause of action addresses

That's a different cause of action.
count I which is based solely on

Mr. Lindsley:
Right, except to the extent that
bailment is a particular kind of contract.
The Court: Oh, yes, we are not addressing that yet.
I suppose we will come to that.
Mr. Lindsley:
would agree.
(emphasis added).
Thus,

If we are not addressing that then 1

(Transcript at 73-74).

it becomes apparent

from a reading

of the trial

transcript that in its ruling, the trial court intended to dismiss
only plaintiffs' first cause of action in breach of contract (which
cause

of

action

alleged

a detailed

lease

arrangement),

and

expressly recognized that plaintiffs' third cause of action, also
a contract claim in bailment, was being preserved.

It is also

evident from a simple reading of the transcript that all parties
surely understood that plaintiffs intended to continue to assert a
claim under their bailment cause of action, including a claim that
Brown specifically undertook to obtain insurance before flying the
airplane.

In view of this portion of the trial transcript,

defendant Brown cannot claim in good faith, as it did with respect
to plaintiffs' first cause of action, that he relied on the court's
dismissal in failing to present evidence on the bailment issue, as
it is clear from the trial court's statements that it intended to
allow plaintiffs to proceed under this cause of action against
16

Brown.

Further, it is clear from the record that Brown did,

indeed, present evidence regarding plaintiffs' bailment claim.
(See Transcript, at 206-209, in which defendant Brown's counsel
asks detailed questions of Brown regarding insurance on airplane,
discussions
airplane).

between
In

parties,

contrast,

and

control

plaintiffs

and

would

possession

be

of

significantly

prejudiced if this Court were to rule that the trial court's
dismissal of plaintiffs' first cause of action resulted in a denial
of his claim in bailment, when it is clear from the trial court's
ruling that the bailment claim would be reserved for a later
ruling.
As plaintiffs discussed in their brief in the initial appeal,
plaintiffs'

first cause of action was based

on a specific,

comprehensive leasing agreement that Diumenti alleged and testified
to, which

agreement

allegedly

included

particular

terms

for

compensation and other details.
Both defendants denied that such an agreement was ever entered
into or consummated, and testified that the course of dealings
between the parties was one as Brown describes "to explore the
possibility of using" the airplane (Brown testimony, Transcript at
34), including taking the airplane to Tooele for refueling and then
on to Logan for the purpose "of checking it out and weighing it"
(Brown testimony, Transcript at 40-41), attendant their "looking at
the possibility of doing commuter work ... between Logan and Salt
Lake." (Brown testimony, Transcript at 30) Brown also acknowledged
17

the following: that he was present at the first meeting to discuss
leasing or using the airplane (Brown testimony, Transcript at 3437); that insurance coverage for his piloting of the airplane was
specifically a matter discussed at that meeting (Brown testimony,
Transcript at 36, lines 5-7; also see Diumenti transcript at 1112); that he took a test flight in the airplane, familiarized
himself with the controls on multiple occasions, inquired of the
airplane's physical condition with Bart Hocker who he described as
"our mechanic," and as intended was the pilot when he and Ritter
took actual possession of and flew the plane on the day of the
crash.
Plaintiffs1 third cause of action was also one in contract,
based on theories arising from bailment, i.e. actual possession and
use of the airplane. Bailments come in sundry forms, and include
leases, rentals, loans, and storage, and as defined in 8 Am Jur 2d
798 Bailments Section 2, "A "bailment," in its ordinary legal
signification, imports the delivery of personal property by one
person to another in trust for a specific purpose, with a contract,
express or implied, that the trust shall be faithfully executed,
and the property returned or duly accounted for when the special
purpose is accomplished, or kept until the bailor reclaims it".
The essence of bailment is title in one party and possession with
another. Black's defines bailment:

18

A delivery of goods or personal property, by one person
to another, in trust for the execution of a special
object upon or in relation to such goods, beneficial
either to the bailor or bailee or both, and upon a
contract, express or implied, to perform the trust and
carry out such object, and thereupon either to redeliver
the goods to the bailor or otherwise dispose of the same
in conformity with the purpose of the trust.
There is no question that Brown had taken possession and was
exercising control over the airplane. He obtained the keys and was
flying the plane. There is no question that this use was attendant
a course of discussions that included Brown specifically.

While

the trial court found that there was not a specific leasing
agreement as alleged in plaintiffs1 first cause of action, there
was obviously some kind of arrangement or agreement relating to the
possession of the airplane, because Brown and Ritter had taken over
control and possession of the airplane, their mechanic was doing
work on the airplane and they were flying it to check it out
attendant their "possibility of doing commuter work."
The existence of possession and control and the intentions of
the parties with respect to the property involved in a bailment are
factual questions, and an appellate court should not set aside a
trial court's factual findings unless they are against the clear
weight of the evidence or it reaches a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made.
(Utah App. 1992).

McPherson v. Belnap, 830 P.2d 302

There is more than ample evidence in this case

to support a finding that a bailment existed between Diumenti and
Brown and Ritter.
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The only real issue that was before the trial court was
whether the terms of the bailment agreement pursuant to which Brown
had taken possession of and was using the airplane included an
agreement to assure that he was covered by insurance while flying
the craft.

The trial court, both at the time of its original

ruling, and again more specifically in its ruling after this case
was remanded

(See Exhibit "B"), weighed the testimony of the

parties and made a finding of fact that the agreement did include
such a provision and that Brown and Ritter had breached that
specific agreement. That finding was well supported by Diumentifs
testimony that defendants had agreed to contact the insurance
carrier and make arrangements to add Brown to the existing policy
or, alternatively, obtain alternative coverage, and that Diumenti
told Brown he would not fly the aircraft until coverage were
obtained, to which Brown agreed (Diumenti transcript at 16, lines
21-24; page 33, lines 15-21; page 50, line 16 through 51, line 24).
That finding is further supported by Brown's acknowledgement that
there was a specific conversation regarding the matter of getting
"a waiver for me on his insurance since I didn't meet the open
pilot clause" on the existing insurance policy (Testimony of Brown,
Transcript at 36 lines 5-7; also Diumenti transcript at 11-12),
that he understood the importance of insurance (Brown testimony,
Transcript at 222) and that in Brown's ordinary course of doing
business they assured that their pilots were specifically named on
their insurance policies even if they were covered by the open
20

pilot clause in order to absolutely assure insurance coverage
(Brown testimony, Transcript at 224 lines 15-25).
Additionally, Brown acknowledged that although he had been
flying regularly since 1954, he primarily utilized aircraft he did
not own, and usually leased or rented or borrowed airplanes (Brown
testimony, Transcript at 11, and 24), including in his commercial
enterprises.

Frequently

the

leases were

testimony, Transcript at 24, line 8).

"per use."

(Brown

This testimony, in

conjunction with his testimony acknowledging the importance of
assuring insurance coverage for individual pilots, constitutes more
than sufficient basis for the trial court to find that this
occasion and "use" of the plaintiffs' airplane was per an express
bailment agreement (i.e. not stolen or otherwise unauthorized)
which included an agreement to not use the airplane without
assurance of insurance coverage.
The standard of review here is well established.
are viewed

The facts

favorable to the verdict and where there is any

reasonable support in the evidence for the verdict, it will not be
disturbed on appeal. Barlow Upholstery & Furniture Co. v. Emmel.
533 P.2d 900, at 902 (Utah 1975) Factual findings of the trial
court

"shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous" with "due

regard given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses." Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782
P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989).
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The trial court correctly ascertained that (1) Brown had taken
possession of and was using the airplane (2) pursuant to an express
bailment agreement that included the promise that insurance would
be verified

or otherwise

obtained

prior

to

such use.

Brown

challenges neither the finding that such insurance was not obtained
or provided, nor the finding of damages as awarded by the trial
court arising out of that failure.

The trial court's ruling and

judgment should accordingly be upheld.
POINT II: DEFENDANT BROWN IS LIABLE TO PLAINTIFFS DUE TO
HIS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH HIS AGREEMENT NOT TO FLY THE
AIRPLANE WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING INSURANCE COVERAGE
Defendant Brown argues incorrectly that, even if a bailment
with Brown existed, Brown cannot be liable because either (a) the
bailment contract was implied and did not include any provisions
regarding insurance, or (b) plaintiffs must, in any event, show
that defendant Brown was negligent.

The first argument completely

ignores the trial court's specific findings, Exhibit "B", that as
part of the bailment contract, there was an express agreement by
the defendants to assure there was insurance to cover the airplane
while it was in defendants' possession.

As indicated above, this

finding is well supported by the trial testimony of Diumenti, Brown
and others.
Defendant's

second argument that Brown could not be held

liable under a bailment theory in the absence of a showing of
negligence, ignores not only the trial court's

finding of

an

express undertaking with respect to insurance, but well-settled
22

law.

As noted in 8 Am. Jur.2d, Bailments, Section 54, a bailment

contract is governed by the same rules of law that govern other
contracts.

Similarly, the specific terms of a bailment contract,

express or implied, determine the rights, duties and liabilities of
the parties to each other. See Miller v. Bank of Holly Springs, 95
So. 129 (Miss 1923), and 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Bailments, Section 133.
It is well-settled that an express agreement between the
bailor and bailee will modify, consistent with general contract
principles, the general rule that a bailee is liable for loss to
bailed

goods only

if he is shown to be negligent. Dresser

Industries, Inc. v. Foss Launch and Tug Co.. 560 P.2d 393 (Alaska
1977); C.J.M. Construction. Inc. v. Chandler Plumbing & Heating.
708 P.2d 60 (Alaska 1985).

Similarly, the parties to a bailment

agreement can provide that one party is responsible for carrying or
obtaining insurance for the benefit of both, and in such case, the
party who takes on responsibility will be liable for the entire
loss.

Dresser, 560 P.2d at 395.

That is precisely the situation

in the instant case, in which the trial court found that defendants
Brown and Ritter had expressly undertaken to obtain insurance on
the airplane.
While in the absence of a special agreement the obligations of
parties to a bailment contract will be fixed by law, the parties to
a bailment may make their own express contracts with respect to
their respective obligations and liabilities, for the purpose of
enlarging, abridging or modifying the bailment which is implied by
23

law,

Allen v. Southern Pac. Co,, 213 P. 2d 667 (Utah 1950);

Thompson Lumber Co. v. Cozier Container Corp., 333 P.2d 1004 (Idaho
1959).

See also 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Bailments, Sections 132-136, 139.

Thus, while it is true, as defendant Brown contends, that bailees
are not ordinarily responsible for damages not attributable to
their fault, that common law rule may be altered by an express
contract.

Lauvetz v. Alaska Sales and Service, 828 P.2d 162

(Alaska 1992).
It is undisputed, as indicated above, that the parties to a
bailment can provide by express terms that one party is responsible
for procuring full insurance for the benefit of both.

Michigan

Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. National Surety Corp., 156 F.2d 329 (8th
Cir. 1946); Texas Van Lines, Inc. v. Godfrey, 313 S.W. 2d 922
(Texas 1958); Dresser, 560 P.2d at 395; See also 8 Am. Jur. 2d,
Bailments, Section 146.
The trial court had more than sufficient evidence to enter a
finding that as part of the bailment agreement, defendant Brown
(and Ritter) agreed that the airplane would not be flown by them
until Brown was included on the existing policy, or alternative
coverage was obtained.

The trial court further found that such

express agreement was assented to by the Brown.
Southern Pac. Co, 213 P.2d

at 668.

See Allen v.

Such an express bailment

arrangement is enforceable under general contract principles, which
would hold defendant Brown liable for the loss resulting from his
failure to comply with such bailment terms.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court found that Brown used plaintiffs' airplane and
had possession and control of such airplane.
authorized; that authorization included

Brown's use was

an agreement that he

wouldn't use the airplane unless and until he had verified or
secured insurance coverage.

He hadn't secured or verified or

assured insurance coverage for his use of the airplane, and he
subsequently destroyed the airplane in a crash.

The plaintiffs

suffered damages, as a result, in the sum of $33,183.86. The trial
court appropriately,
findings

that

fairly, and in accordance with specific

an express bailment

contract

existed,

judgment in plaintiffs' favor and against Brown.

entered

That judgment

should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this &*- I

day of June, 1994.
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GARFF, Judge:
Defendant Larry E. Brown appeals the trial court's ruling
that he breached an oral agreement to obtain insurance to protect
against damage to plaintiffs' airplane, which was leased to
Arthur J. Ritter and Brown.
The trial court found that in 1984, Ritter and Brown leased
plaintiffs' airplane. The court also found that the parties
orally agreed that Brown and Ritter would use the airplane only
after they had been added to plaintiffs' insurance or after they
had obtained their own insurance. Pursuant to this agreement,
the parties understood that the insurance would cover the use of
the airplane by Ritter and Brown. The court further found that
Ritter and Brown failed to obtain the requisite insurance.
On May 9, 1984, the airplane, while in the possession of
Ritter and Brown, was damaged during a landing at the Tooele
Valley Airport. When the accident occurred, neither Brown nor
Ritter were covered by plaintiffs' existing insurance policy on

the airplane, nor had they obtained insurance covering their
operation of the airplane.
Plaintiffs sued Ritter and Brown claiming (1) breach of
contract; (2) negligence; and (3) bailment. The case was tried
in April 1989. After plaintiffs' case in chief, Brown moved to
dismiss plaintiffs' breach of contract claim, which motion was
granted. The court took the matter under advisement after the
trial.
The court issued a memorandum decision on June 14, 1989,
adjudicating defendants liable, jointly and severally, to
plaintiffs based on a contractual theory. On July 18, 1989, the
court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
judgment. The court ruled that defendants' liability was based
solely on a breach of contract by failing to obtain insurance to
cover damage to the airplane. The court did not refer to
plaintiffs' negligence or bailment causes of action in its
memorandum decision, findings, or conclusions.
Brown argues that the trial court erred in granting judgment
against him on a contractual theory. We do not defer to the
court's legal conclusion concerning the imposition of liability
for breach of contract, but review it for correctness. Scharf v.
BMG Corp. , 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
Brown claims that the court misled him by dismissing the
first cause of action alleging a contract between the parties and
subsequently imposing liability based on breach of contract.
Thus, he contends the court deprived him of the opportunity to
defend against the breach of contract claim in his case in chief.
In contrast, plaintiffs argue that their bailment cause of action
also sounded in contract, and that the court based its ruling on
the bailment cause of action rather than on the breach of
contract claim, which was previously dismissed. Plaintiffs'
argument is without merit. We recognize that the "relation
[between] bailor and bailee is created in contract." Potomac
Ins. Co. v. Nickson. 64 Utah 395, 231 P. 445, 448 (1924); see
also Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., 103 Utah 44, 132 P.2d 680,
685 (1943) ("the entire duty of the bailee with respect to the
bailed chattel is based on the bailment contract").1 The court,
however, did not refer to bailment in its memorandum decision,
1. A bailment is created when a party's personal property is
delivered to another "in trust for a specific purpose, with an
express or implied contract that the property will be returned or
accounted for when the specific purpose has been accomplished or
when the bailor reclaims the property." Christensen v. Hoover,
643 P.2d 525, 528-29 (Colo. 1982).
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findings, or conclusions. Moreover, the court did not make any
findings or conclusions concerning negligence, which-is the basis
for liability in a cause of action for bailment. Sumsionr 132
P.2d at 685-86; see also Barlow Upholstery & Furniture v. Emmel,
533 P.2d 900, 901 (Utah 1975) (a "bailee has a duty to exercise
reasonable care and caution commensurate with acceptance of the
responsibility of safekeeping the property of others entrusted to
him").
Therefore, we conclude that the court erred when, after
dismissing the first cause of action for breach of contract, it
concluded that Brown was liable to plaintiffs for breach of
contract. Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) r the
dismissal * "operates as an adjudication on the merits" of the
breach of contract claim.2 In reliance on the court'sr dismissal,
Brown did not present evidence in defense of the breach of
contract claim. Because Brown was prejudiced3 by the dismissal
and subsequent .ruling based on breach -of contract, we reverse the
trial courts judgment and remand for a determination- of the

2. Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in
relevant part:
Unless the court in its order for dismissal
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this
subdivision and any dismissal not provided
for in this rule . . . operates as an
adjudication upon the merits.
3. Cf. Radlev v. Smith. 6 Utah 314, 313 P.2d 465, 467 (1957)
("[a] party who is advised of the issues and given full and fair
opportunity to meet them is in no position to claim surprise or
error as to the issues litigated"); National Farmers Union
Property and Casualty Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d 249,
253 (1955) ("if an issue is to be tried and a party's rights
concluded with respect thereto, he must have notice thereof and
an opportunity to meet it"); Morris v. Russell. 120 Utah 545, 236
P.2d 451, 455 (1951) (court did not err in reinstating previously
dismissed count because "[t]here is no showing that the
defendants were misled or prevented from presenting all their
evidence or in amy way prejudiced by reinstating the count") .

910040-CA
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negligence and bailment claims on which the court did not rule.
Inasmupir^Ss^the parties hav^ presented all. their evidence, we see
no n££d for k new ta/Lal.,

Regnal W. Garff, Judga/"^

WE CONCUR:

Norman H. Jackson, flludge

Gregory/^. Orme, Judge
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DOUGLAS J. ALLRED and,
GEORGE S. DIUMENTL

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
LARRY H. BROWN and ARTHUR,
J.RnTER

Case No. C86-3354
Judge James S. Sawaya

Defendant

On June 8, 1993, defendant's Motion to Amend Findings came on for oral argument, with
James C. Lewis appearing for plaintiffs, and Brian Bamard appearing for defendant. The matter
was fully argued and submitted. Based upon the pleadings submitted in this matter, and oral
argument, the Court finds as follows:

DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

In 1984, plaintiffs delivered to defendants sole possession and control of a twin

engine Cessna 414 (the "airplane").
2.

After taking sole possession and control of the airplane, defendant made use of the

airplane.
3.

Defendant Brown was present and participated at a meeting wherein the lease or

use of the aircraft was discussed. In addition, at such meeting, 'the parties, and defendant Brown
discussed specifically obtaining insurance on the plane.
4.

On or about May 9, 1984, while defendant Brown was piloting the plane, the

airplane crashed at the Tooele Valley Airport, resulting in substantial property damage in the sum
of $33,133.86.
5.

Prior to the airplane crash, defendant Brown flew the plane, did landings on a

flight to Pocatello, Idaho, under the supervision of the owners and a pilot they had retained for
that flight. Defendant Brown inspected and viewed the plane on various other occasions prior
to the airplane crash to make sure that he knew where the controls were, their functions and how
operate them.
6.

Prior to the airplane crash, Brown inquired of the airplane's physical condition in

conversations with Bart Harker, the individual who Brown described as "our mechanic and who
was doing some work on the airplane.
7.

In connection with the delivery of possession and control of the airplane to

defendants, defendants agreed to obtain insurance on the aircraft.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The evidence before the Court supports a finding that possession and control of the
airplane was delivered to defendants under a bailment arrangement, and that defendants were
bailees under such arrangement.
8.

The evidence further supports a finding that, under the bailment, there was an

express agreement between the parties that defendants would obtain insurance to cover the
airplane during the time the airplane was in the defendants possession.
9.

During the time the airplane was in defendant's possession, defendants, as bailees,

had sole possession and right to control the airplane.
10.

As a result of defendants failure to obtain insurance, plaintiffs were damaged in

the sum of $33,133.86.
11.

That defendants, as bailees of the airplane, were responsible for any damages

caused to the aircraft as a result of their failure to obtain insurance as agreed.
12.

That plaintiffs* are entitled to a judgment against defendant Brown for the sum of

$33,133.86, together with interest thereon from December, 1986.
Dated this

day of July, 1993.

James S. Sawaya
District Judge
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